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The control and protection of user data is a very important aspect in the design and
deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT). The heterogeneity of IoT technologies, the large
number of devices and systems, and the different types of users and roles create important
challenges in this context. In particular, requirements of scalability, interoperability, trust
and privacy are difficult to address even with the considerable amount of existing work
both in the research and standardization community. In this paper we propose a Model-
based Security Toolkit, which is integrated in a management framework for IoT devices,
and supports specification and efficient evaluation of security policies to enable the pro-
tection of user data. Our framework is applied to a Smart City scenario in order to
demonstrate its feasibility and performance.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In this paper we adopt the IoT definition from Sundmaeker
et al. (2010): IoT links the objects of the real world with the virtual
world, thus enabling anytime, anyplace connectivity for anything
and not only for anyone. It refers to a world where physical objects
and beings, as well as virtual data and environments, all interact
with each other in the same space and time. These things should be
able to exchange information and provide services through
different means and from different places.
For the purposes of this paper, we consider the extended
realm of smart devices interconnected through the Internet.
The heterogeneity of technologies, devices, and applications
domains with their specific requirements and boundaryuropa.eu (R. Neisse), gary
a.eu (G. Baldini).
y Elsevier Ltd. This is a
).conditions makes the design of a generic framework for IoT
extremely complex. In this context, new challenges raise
under the cyber-security perspective as information is
exchanged among things with different capabilities and users
with different roles and data usage permissions.
The research problems we address in this paper are a) hot to
ensure that user needs for security and privacy are validated in
the evolution of internet towards IoT and b) how trust re-
lationships can be established and managed between the IoT
technology and the individuals who use such technology
(Kounelis et al., 2014). In comparison to Internet, IoT will in-
crease the synergy between the real and the digital world. The
amountofdatacollectedby IoTsensorswill bemuch larger than
in the current Internet and the data itself will be more detailed
and related to the daily activities of the citizen. For example,.steri@jrc.ec.europa.eu (G. Steri), igor.nai-fovino@jrc.ec.europa.eu
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servers at any time of the day and their information could be
linked to the specific actions of the citizen like shopping in a
mall (e.g., interactionwith commercial Location Based Services
in an areas). This flow of information can have serious privacy
issues unless it is not controlled properly and in accordance to
thewishesandpreferencesof thecitizen.Theanonymizationof
data during data collection in the IoT device could be one of the
approaches to mitigate privacy risks. In addition, privacy risks
can be increased by the digital divide phenomenon. Users with
more technical knowledge have usually a better perception of
the risks when using IoT devices and applications, and also are
more capable of protecting themselves.
New tools and technologies like the one presented in this
paper should address the presence of the digital divide and
support the individual in his/her interaction with the IoT.
Beyondprivacy, security issues are likely to bemore important
in IoT than Internet. IoT actuators can impact the safety of the
citizen if a malicious attacker take them over or send wrong
information to impair their decision process. There is the need
for a tool or technology which enforces policies for IoT actua-
tors to avoid the execution of actions, which impact safety.
Another aspect to be addressed for the design and deployment
of security and privacy solutions in IoT is the dynamic context
where IoT devices must operate. Should the IoT sensor worn
by an individual, implement the same policies for security and
privacy at home or in an office environment? In the case of a
natural disaster, can IoT devices implement specific policies to
support the personnel involved in disaster response (e.g.,
provide real-time data to them). It is needed that security and
privacy solutions designed for IoT support dynamic context.
In this paper, we propose a Model-based Security Toolkit
named SecKit (Neisse, Fovino et al.) in order to address the
challenges described above. The SecKit supports integrated
modeling of the IoT system design and runtime viewpoints to
allow an integrated specification of security requirements,
threat scenarios, trust relationships, and usage control pol-
icies (Neisse, Pretschner et al.; Neisse, Pretschner, Giacomob).
The SecKit integrates previously published approaches for
policy refinement (Neisse and Doerr), policy enforcement
technology at different levels of abstraction with strong gua-
rantees (Neisse, Holling et al.), context-based policy specifi-
cation (Neisse et al., 2008), and trust management (Neisse
et al., 2014). In contrast to existing general purpose and IoT-
focused security approaches, which address some punctual
security issues such as access control, risk, or trust without
considering details and interrelations between these issues,
the SecKit proposes an Enterprise Architecture (Schafrik, 2011)
approach for security engineering. Moreover, SecKit has been
conceived with the ultimate scope to give to the end-user the
possibility to design and enforce a set of security and privacy
policies completely customized; in other words, it is the end-
user that decides the desirable trade-off between information
disclosure, privacy and security.
SecKit has been integratedwith the iCore Framework,which
is a generic framework for IoT management. We demonstrate
the feasibility of the SecKit components embedded in the iCore
Framework and we provide results of simulations to support
our theoretical foundation. In contrast to our previous publi-
cation that already introduces the iCore Framework includingthe SecKit approach and prototype implementation (Neisse,
Fovino et al.), in this paper we show the formalization of
someof the SecKitmetamodels andwe also provide extensions
to our policy rule language allowing the management of trust
relationships. As a consequence, we build up on our SecKit
solution towards a more complete coverage of the main chal-
lenges in the existing IoT frameworks with a special focus on
data protection, trust, and privacy issues.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
IoT framework we adopt and extend in this paper. Section 3
presents the formalization of the SecKit design and runtime
metamodels. Section 4 introduces the proposed architecture
and enforcement components implemented in the SecKit. In
Section 5 our extended IoT framework is applied to a Smart
City case study with an illustration of the flexibility to address
the dynamic security aspects of this scenario including per-
formance evaluation results of our implementation. Section 6
compares our framework with other approaches from IoT
standards and research literature. Finally, Section 7 presents
the conclusions and future developments.2. Internet of Things framework
The work proposed in this paper derives from the iCore Proj-
ect, which has the goal to mitigate the complexity and het-
erogeneity of different objects and technologies while
maximizing the exploitation and provision of IoT objects and
their services. The iCore Project proposes the abstraction of
IoT using the Service concept, which is further refined in
Composite Virtual Objects (CVOs) and Virtual Objects (VOs). A
VO is a virtual representation of any real-world object (RWO)
or digital object. A car, for example, can be represented as a
CVO consisting of an engine, various sensors, and a commu-
nication system, which are all represented by VOs. Finally, a
complete system or device can provide access to their capa-
bilities represented by a Service. The overall architecture of
the iCore Framework based VO, CVO and Service layers is
described in Fig. 1, see (iCore, 2015) for a detailed description.
The Security Management layer is indeed the layer where
SecKit is deployed. It consists of the cross-layer components
provided by the SecKit for authentication and security policy
evaluation. The Identity Provider component is responsible
for the user authentication, which can be achieved using
different technical solutions. The specification of policy rules
referencing identities is done using an abstract identity design
model that can be mapped to the specific technical choice.
The evaluation of the policies by the PDP is done using events
signaled by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) deployed at the
different layers of the framework. The SecKit components are
described more in detail in Section 4.3. The Model-based Security Toolkit (SecKit)
In this section, we describe a Model-based Security Toolkit
(SecKit) to address the IoT challenges for security and privacy
described in the introduction and which are summarized
again in the following list. In the rest of the paper, wewill refer
to this list and these challenges to highlight how each specific
Fig. 1 e iCore Framework overall architecture.
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overall toolkit support a trustful relationship between IoT
technologies and users.
1. Support for Dynamic Context: Design for Security and
Privacy in IoT should include support for Dynamic Context
to ensure that the security and privacy requirements are
satisfied when there are changes in the context (e.g., home
vs office), where the IoT devices must operate;
2. Support for Trust Management: Security policy rules in IoT
scenarios should consider trust relationships established
by users with IoT devices and operators. In order to be
meaningful, the precise scope and semantics of the trust
relationship should be explicitly defined, specifying what
the entity should be trusted for (e.g., privacy protection and
identity provisioning);
3. Support for the Digital Divide: Users have different knowl-
edge and capabilities in accessing IoT devices and appli-
cations. Depending on their level of technical proficiency,
users have different level of perceptions of the privacy risks
and knowledge of the technical solutions to address them.
Thedesign of security andprivacy solutions should address
the digital divide of the different categories of users;
4. Control of the data flow from IoT Device: The user should
be able to define the type and amount of data, which is
transmitted out of the IoT device. For usability, the control
on the flow of data should be automatic and have more
granularity than the current informed content approach
based on End-User License Agreement;5. Control of the actions of IoT actuators: Regardless of the
design and implementation of IoT actuators (e.g., IoT de-
vices, which execute actions in the real world), security
solutions should prevent specific actions which could be
harmful to the safety of the user;
6. Anonymization of data: Solution for privacy in IoT should
support anonymization of the data collected and distrib-
uted by the IoT devices. For example, the identity of the
user could be replaced by pseudonyms generated to protect
the privacy of the user.
In a worldwhere IoT objects aremore andmore interacting
and exchanging data, it is extremely important to be able to
define and impose “rules of conduct” through mechanisms
allowing to identify the most suitable security policies to be
applied in a given scenario, to define the level of trust of the
counterpart, and to regulate the information flows. The SecKit
aims at achieving these objectives supporting integrated pol-
icy specification and enforcement at the Service, CVO, and VO
layers of the iCore Framework. The SecKit foundation is a
collection of metamodels that provides the basis for security
engineering tooling, add-ons, runtime components, and ex-
tensions to address security, data protection, trust, and pri-
vacy requirements. In contrast to other approaches, the SecKit
precisely specifies the relation between the security concepts
and other security-relevant system concepts. Furthermore,
the SecKit metamodels can be used as a abstract reference for
conceptual agreements between different domains contrib-
uting to the interoperability alignment between them. The
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Context, Structure, Behavior, Risk, Trust, and Rule meta-
models implemented using the Eclipse Modeling Framework
(EMF) (E. Foundation, 2014) to support the specification of
types, instantiations, and instances of the various concepts.
All the Java classes generated from the metamodels and
supporting runtime components are available as an open
source project at https://github.com/r-neisse/SecKit.
In a nutshell, the Time metamodel specifies time units,
timestamps, time durations, and time intervals. The Rulemet-
amodel specifies abstract Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rule
templates and configurations. The Data metamodel specifies
data types mapped one-to-one to the iCore metamodel. The
Identity metamodel specifies identity types and attributes. The
Rolemetamodel specifies role types and hierarchy. The Context
metamodel specifies context information, context situations,
and Quality-of-Context attributes. The Trust metamodel spec-
ifies trust relationships related to specific trust aspects. The
Structure metamodel specifies entities and interaction point
mechanisms. The Behavior metamodel specifies behavior and
activities (actionsand interactions). Finally, theRiskmetamodel
specifies assets, vulnerabilities, threats, risk, and countermea-
sures mapped to rules or trust relationships.
SecKit can be used to specify and enforce policy rules for
anoymization, confidentiality, data retention (e.g., delete data
in 30 days), user consent, access control, non-repudiation, and
trust management. Our focus in this paper is on the support
provided by SecKit for the specification and enforcement of
trust management and usage control policy rules. The policy
rules in SecKit, consisting of authorizations and obligations,
are specified as ECA enforcement rules. These rules use as a
reference the set of inter-related design models, conforming to
their respective metamodels, representing the different as-
pects of the IoT system. These designmodels are used as input
by the runtime models and components in the SecKit
enforcement platform, enabling monitoring of ECA rules and
execution of enforcement behavior.
In the following subsections we present parts of the formal
specification of our design metamodels using the Z language.
Screenshots of the SecKit Graphical User Interface (GUI) imple-
mentationforall thedifferentmodelsarepresented inaprevious
publication (Neisse, Fovino et al.). The association of the ECA
rules with these design models allows for checking of policy
consistency with respect to the IoT system design models and
the precise identification of policy enforcement points. All the
metamodels introduced in the following subsections are con-
nected to the policy rule language described in the last subsec-
tion by means of events, event patterns, and specific pattern
matchingoperators.TheTimeandRiskmodelsarenotdescribed
in detail since the first is a trivial supportingmetamodel and the
latter is part of our ongoing work. The time metamodel in-
troduces the Timestamp, TimeDuration, TimeInterval, and TimeUnit
types that are used in the following specifications.
3.1. Data
Our formalization of the system starts with the specification of
the set of available data types, identified by name (Data-
TypeName). We model a set of available primitive types (Primi-
tiveType) definedusing theprimitivedata types (EmfType) of EMF(E. Foundation, 2014). Data type names can be used in the
specification of composite data type (CompositeType) attributes
(Attribute), whichmay also reference recursively by name other
composite data types. Composite types may be defined as a
subtype of other composite types, using the transitive, irre-
flexive, and asymmetric inheritancemapping getSuperTypeOf of
a composite data typewith the set of its super types. Sets of data
types are associated to data type packages (DataTypePackage).
Data types can be used to declare data instantiations
(DataInst) at design time. Data instances (Data) are created
dynamically at runtime or statically at design time making
reference to the defined data instantiations. Since we use a
shared set of data type nameswe define constraints to prevent
duplicate names. We also define a constraint using the tran-
sitive closure of getSuperTypeOf that forbids a composite type
to be indirectly a subclass of itself, which is in alignment with
the specifications of the EMF metamodel. Data instantiations
(DataInst) are used to specify identity types and also to specify
the data instantiations established by activities in the
behavior model.
In our security policy rule language patterns can be specified
in policy rules to match data instances at runtime in the rule
conditions. The following specification introduces the Data-
Pattern type, which is used tomatch instances of a specific data
instantiation (DataInstPattern), data typename(DataTypePattern),
and that match a specific data instance value according to the
data value pattern (DataValuePattern). We support in our imple-
mentation the interpretation of data values as regular expres-
sions, XPath expressions, or static literal patterns.
Patterns may include variables in order to enable config-
urable security policy rule templates. Our strategy is to define
the type DataVarDecl representing a named variable declara-
tion that can be used in place of the respective type in the
pattern specification. We follow the same strategy in the
specification of patterns for identities, context situations,
roles, structural and behavioral elements.
We define below the pattern matching for data instances.
For every pattern matching relation we have a choice of
evaluating a static pattern or a parametrized pattern with a
variable, which is a simple match of the variable value. It is
important to notice that data types and instantiations are
matched by name even for the variables, while data values are
matched by the Data type when variables are used. A data
instance matches a pattern if they refer to the same instan-
tiation and if the evaluation of the data value against an
expression using the function eval is satisfied. The eval
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in the context of the data pattern definition, or performs a
simple string comparison of the static data value defined in
the data pattern for the given value in the data instance. We
allow the specification of data patterns that match more than
one data instance using the reserved typed wildcard any for
data type and instantiation names.
In our metamodel we relate data instantiations and data
instances with a set of data concepts (DataConcept). An
ontology of data concepts is useful in the specification of ab-
stract security policy rules that apply to a concept indepen-
dently of the system activity that handles the data. The
definition of a data ontology, tracking static information flow
analysis at design time, and dynamic information flow
tracking at runtime are out of the scope of this paper.
Data types are instantiated in the specification of identity
types, context information types, and activity types to repre-
sent their data input and output. The datamodel also supports
inheritance, which enables specification of security policy
rules for abstract data types. For example, an enforcement
template defined for the PersonProfile is also applicable for a
SocialNetworkProfile if the latter is a subtype of the former. Data
types can be imported from an ECore model specified using
the standard Eclipse EMF tooling.
3.2. Identity
Our model of identity types follow a simple attribute-based
approach, where the subject name and identity attributes are
part of the data instantiation set. An identity type is defined by
a name (IdentityTypeName), a mandatory subject name (Sub-
jectName) of the string EmfType, and a set of identity attribute
declarations (IdentityAttributeType). Identity instantiations
(IdentityInst) areused in conjunctionwithdata instantiations to
model the results of activities in the behavior model. An
identity instance includes an identifier of the identity and one
of the identity issuer (IdentityId  IdentityId), allowing for self
signed and 3rd party certified identities. Identity patterns
(IdentityPattern) are also supported for both types of identities
in our security policy rule language, as specified below.We define the matchesIdentityInst and matchesIdentity re-
lations between identity instantiations and instances using the
data pattern satisfaction relation as a building block. An iden-
tity instance matches an identity pattern if the instantiation is
a match, if the subject is a match, and if all the attributes are a
match for the pattern. Furthermore, for certified identity pat-
terns the identity issuer may also be matched. Similar to data
patterns, we support the specification of identity patterns that
match more then one identity type, using the any wildcard for
identity type and instantiation names.
The identity model specifies the identity types and their
respective identity attributes. Our model abstracts from spe-
cific technical details of the adopted identity management
solutions, it only provides a high-level description of the
identity types and attributes that can be used in the specifi-
cation of security policy rules.
3.3. Roles
The role model specifies the role types and the role hierarchy
with a possible inheritance of membership from role types.
Identities are assigned to role types and the isSubRoleOf rela-
tion maps a role type to a parent role, with the added
constraint to prevent cycles in the role hierarchy definition. A
role pattern is trivially the specification of a type that should
match a specific role, or indirectly a parent role, and an
identity pattern that should be contained in thematching role
type hierarchy. In our security policy rule language role pat-
terns can be specified in policy rules to match role member-
ship at runtime in the rule conditions. A role pattern can be
used to allow or deny the execution of an activity depending
on the assigned role. For example, Doctor and Nurse are both
sub roles of the HealthProfessional role, where entities assigned
to the child roles are also members of the parent role. The
assignment of identities to role types is done in the runtime
model specification in the SecKit.
3.4. Context
A Context Information is a simple type of information about
one entity that is acquired at a particular moment in time, and
Context Situation is a complex type that models a specific
condition that begins and finishes at specificmoments in time
(Dockhorn Costa et al., 2012). For example, the Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) location is an example of a context in-
formation type, while Fever and In One Kilometer Range are
examples of situations where a patient has a temperature
above 37 C, or a target entity has a set of nearby entities not
further than one kilometer away. Patient and target entity are
the roles of the different entities in that specific situation. A
context information type (ContextInformationType) is defined as
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situation type (ContextSituationType) is defined as a mapping
from a name to a set of situation role names (Sit-
uationRoleName). We plan to integrate in the SecKit the
approach proposed by Dockhorn Costa et al. (2012).
The formalization of context information and situation
instances is out of the scope of this paper. We allow in our
security policy rule language situation events and situation
event patterns to detect the beginning and end of a context
situation. In our trust model we define the PersonalTrust and
SituationalTrust types that specify trust relationships valid for
a set of entities in a specific situation. With our context met-
amodel we address the challenge Support for Dynamic Context
identified in the list of challenges introduced in Section 3.3.5. Behavior and structure
The SecKit Structure and Behavior metamodels are inspired
by an existing generic design language to represent the ar-
chitecture of a distributed system across application domains
and successive levels of abstraction called Interaction System
Design Language (ISDL) (Quartel, 1998; Quartel et al., 2007).
The system design in ISDL is divided into two domains named
entity domain and behavior domain, with an assignment relation
between entities and behaviors. In the entity domain the
designer specifies entities and interaction points between
entities representing the communication mechanisms. In the
behavior domain the behavior of each of the entities is
detailed including actions, interactions, causality relations,
and information attributes. The idea behind the SecKitmodels
inspired by ISDL is to provide a minimal set of concepts that
supports the design of the IoT Services, CVOs, and VOs from
the iCore Framework described in Section 2. Furthermore, one
important feature of ISDL that justifies our choice for this
language is the support for refinement relations, which has
being applied in previous work to support the automated
refinement of security policy rules (Neisse and Doerr).
Fig. 2 shows an example structure and behavior design
model at one arbitrary abstraction level. In this example the
Smart Home entity interacts with the MedicalCenter through an
Interaction Point. The interaction type and the information
exchanged are depicted in the behavior model, which in this
example is the Access heart rate interaction, which exchanges
the heart rate data (hr). The contribution of each behavior type
to the interaction is depicted by a half circle, and represents
the role of the behavior in the interaction. A contained
behavior represents a VO, and the container behavior a CVO.Fig. 2 e Entity and behavior domains.In our behavior metamodel we define the possible activity
types (actions and interactions), instantiations, and instances.
Activities are data consumers and producers that are enabled
to be executed by means of causality relations. Here we
consider only the specification of behaviors and activities that
are relevant for specification of security policy rules.
An interaction type (InteractionType) is definedwith a name,
a set of interaction contribution types (InteractionCon-
tributionType), a set of data instantiations, and a set of identity
instantiations representing the values established after an
occurrence of an interaction of this type. We also define
interaction instantiations (InteractionInst) contained in
behavior types at design time, and interaction instances
(Interaction) contained in behavior instances at runtime. An
interaction contribution type specifies a behavior role and a
set of data and identity instantiation names that are the input
of the specific role for the interaction type they participate in.
For example, in Fig. 2 the Smart Home Behavior assumes the
home role and contributes with the hr data to the Access Heart
Rate interaction. Interaction types can be mapped to service
specifications, where typical roles are providers and con-
sumers. However, in our model abstract interactions may
define more than two roles in an interaction.
Interaction contribution types are instantiated by behavior
types and behavior instantiations (BehaviorType, BehaviorInst).
Interaction contribution instantiations of a behavior type
define possible contributions of a type that are instantiated for
all instantiations of the behavior type (InteractionCon-
tributionOfInst). An interaction instantiation (InteractionInst)
connects two or more interaction contribution instantiations
to define a concrete interaction possibility between behaviors.
In our policy rule language we define activity events and
event patterns that match activities defined in the behavior
model, and may also include patterns to match the data and
identity produced by the activity. For example, a security
policy rule can be specified to deny all network interactions of
a specific behavior instance when there is a possibility that
personal data may be exchanged. The following specification
defines behavior types, instantiations, and instances.
In addition to interaction instantiations, behavior types also
specify the contained action instantiations, flow point in-
stantiations, and the causality relations between them. Even
tough we include in our metamodels the causality relations
they are not needed to support the specification of policy rules.
Causality relations are useful to generate executable behavior
specifications, for simulation, and to support information flow
analysis, which is part of our future work.
The security policy rules proposed by us are evaluated
considering events that represent the execution of activities
defined in our behavior model. In order to support the specifi-
cation of these policy rules we define behavior and activity
pattern matching relations. Interaction patterns match an
interaction of a specific instantiation, type, and that establish
specific data and identity results. In addition, an interaction can
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butions participating in the interaction. For example, a privacy
protection policy rule can be defined to deny a data request
interaction (type) defined between aweather station and a cloud
service (instantiation) if the identity of the station owner is
provided by the weather station (contribution). The following
specification introduces the patterns specified for behaviors,
entities, interaction contributions, and interactions.
In the matching of entities and behaviors we also allow the
use of trust relationshippatterns that are introduced in the next
subsection. Similar to our pattern specification approach for
data and identities we also support the typed any wildcard to
match all behavior types, instantiations, and instances (e.g., any
[BehaviorTypeName]). This flexibility in our pattern matching
approach allows very specific policy rules to be specified, for
example, all interactions contained in an IoT system, where a
specific smart home interacts with any other entity. To the best
of our knowledge fine-grained constraints considering the par-
ticipants of an interaction cannot be expressed in any other se-
curity policy languages. Examples of the structure and behavior
design model GUI are shown in our case study in Section 5.
3.6. Trust
In our trust model we adopt the widely accepted definition of
trust as relationship between a Trustor and a Trustee
(Grandison and Sloman, 2000; Quinn et al., 2006). We define
trust as the measurement of the belief from a trusting party point of
view (trustor) with respect to a trusted party (trustee) focused on a
specific trust aspect that possibly implies a benefit or a risk (Neisse
et al., 2014). For example, Bob (Trustor) may trust to a high
degree (measurement) hisWeather Station (Trustee) concerning
its competence to provide accurate weather information (trust
aspect). The benefit or risk implication is only present when
Bob accepts to depend on the weather information for some
activity and may be impaired by inaccuracies, for example,
leave his umbrella at home and arrive wet for an important
meeting. As defined below, a trust relationship (TrustRelation-
ship) is defined from a trustor perspective (referenced using an
identity) for a specific trustee scope, it has an abstract likeli-
hoodmeasurement and it is defined for a specific trust aspect.Our model supports the specification and reasoning about
different types of trust relationships (TrustType) and recom-
mendations (TrustRecommendation). Trust relationships can be
specified directly based on a trustor's arbitrary opinion or
considering previously observed positive/belief or negative/
disbelief evidence about a specific trust aspect. Indirect trust is
specified using the concept of fusion operators that combine a
set of trust relationships that match a specific pattern. For
example, a reputation trust value can be defined by a combi-
nation of recommendations from many entities or a com-
munity. Positive and negative evidence are translated for each
trust aspect to an opinion using the formula illustrated in
Neisse et al. (2014, p. 91).
The seminal work on trust done by Mayer et al. (1995) de-
fines the social trust concept of Trust Beliefs, which is equiva-
lent to a TrustRelationship in our model. Mayer also defines
different scopes for a trust relationship, namely System Trust,
Dispositional Trust, and Situational Trust. Dispositional Trust is
the intrinsic/inherent disposition of a trustor to trust any
trustee in the absence of evidence or previous experiences,
which can be used for bootstrapping of trust relationships.
System Trust is the impersonal trust assigned by a trustor for a
system as a whole without considering a particular target
trustee. Situational Trust represents the trust assigned to a
particular context situation. Finally, Personal Trust is the trust
assigned to a specific trustee in a specific context situation,
represented by an identity pattern. An identity pattern
example is a trust relationship defined for all trustees owning
an identity containing the attribute issued by with value Eu-
ropean Commission.
Different likelihood measurement approaches can be
adopted: in our work we chose to use the Subjective Logic (SL)
(Jøsang, 2010), which is a probabilistic logic capable of
explicitly expressing uncertainty about the probability values.
In SL an opinion is represented by the belief (b), disbelief (d),
and uncertainty (u) where b þ d þ u ¼ 1. We adopt a discrete
mapping of an SL opinion to a set of five trustworthiness values
defined in the LikelihoodMeasurement type previously proposed
by some of the co-authors in a previous publication: when the
uncertainty is lower than the belief/disbelief this represents a very
trustworthy/untrustworthy opinion (Neisse et al., 2014).
The objective of a trust aspect definition is to have a precise
specification of what is the intended meaning of a trust rela-
tionship, including issues related to the provisioning of trust
recommendations, structural, behavior, data, and identity
qualities. The Recommendation Quality aspect is associated to
an entity to provide trust recommendations. For example,
someone may be trusted to recommend a good car mechanic
but not to recommend a restaurant. The Structural Quality
aspect relates to properties of elements in the entity domain
of our systemmodel that are independent of the behavior like,
for example, physical tamper resistance. This trust aspect is
related to entity types (e.g., Weather Station) and interaction
point types (e.g., Wi-Fi). The Behavior Quality aspect is the
quality aspect of an entity behavior that can be specified
considering the quality of the service (e.g., response time),
experience (e.g., usability), or protection (e.g. privacy
enforcement). This trust aspect is related to activity types
(e.g., Update firmware) and interaction contribution roles (e.g.,
manufacturer). The Data Quality aspect is associated to the
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quality level. In an IoT scenario this can be associated to the
precision of sensor information (e.g., temperature). The Iden-
tity Quality aspect is a specialized type of Data Quality trust
related to the level of assurance (LoA) of the identities pro-
vided by an entity. This trust aspect is usually associated to
identity providers and the quality of identity attributes used in
the identities issued by them (e.g., attributes verified face-to-
face).
Trust aspects may overlap when trust relationships are
specified for data or identity provisioning services, which in
this case are assigned respectively to data and identity quality
trust aspects and the specified interaction type may be
omitted. Some trust models associate trust relationships with
an isolated or combined measurement of the concepts of
honesty, credibility, reputation, usability, competence, fit for
purpose, reliability, and quality (Mcknight and Chervany,
1996; Quinn et al., 2006). Our trust model captures precisely
all this different concepts with the definition of the different
trust types, recommendations, and trust aspects. With our
trust metamodel we address the challenge Support for Trust
Management identified in the list of challenges introduced in
Section 3.
The following specifications define the trust pattern types,
which allows matching of trust relationships and recom-
mendations considering a specific trust aspect, degree,
trustor, trustee scope, time interval, and recommenders’
identities. Using this flexible model of combination of trust
based on patterns, it is possible to infer derived trust re-
lationships from different aspects: for example, privacy
enforcement and identity provisioning trust could be com-
bined in a more general service provisioning trust relation-
ship. The matchesTrust evaluates a trust relationship pattern
with respect to the available trust relationships in the trust
database.
Trust assessments are useful in our policy rule language to
define conditions, for example, allowing a specific activity
only if a minimum likelihood measurement is met. We define
below three assessment operators exactly, atLeast, and atMost,
which are evaluated by the evalTrust relation between a like-
lihood measurement and a trust query. Trust queries evalu-
ated using the query relation, using the previously defined
pattern matching relations for trust relationships and rec-
ommendations, consider the trust relationships from one
trustor point of view or the trust recommendations received
from other trustors' point of views. We only support one
concrete example of a fusion operator in our policy rulelanguage, the Consensus trust query element, which ismapped
to the SL consensus operator (Jøsang, 2010) and implemented
in the SL API (Pope et al., 2014). The result of this operator is
increased uncertainty if the combined likelihood measure-
ment values in the received trust recommendations contra-
dict each other.
We only consider exactmatches of patterns andwe require
patterns and relationships to be specified without missing
parameters or duplicate trust relationships for the same
aspect, trustee scope, etc. It is part of our future work to
consider the support for matching of trust relationships and
patterns with undefined parameters where a pattern can
match a set of trust relationships that must be combined
using a fusion operator (e.g., more specific vs. generic match of
trust relationship for the pattern).
3.7. Policy rules
The specification of policy rules in SecKit is done using policy
rule templates thatmust be explicitly configured. A policy rule
template follows an ECA structure, evaluated over a discrete
trace of sets of events with the following semantics: when the
trigger event (E) is observed, and the condition (C) evaluates to
true, the action (A) is executed. Rule templates reference to
the design models of the system data, identity, role, context,
structure, behavior, and trust. In this subsection we show the
formalization of events, event patterns, the operators sup-
ported in the condition of a policy rule, and the formalization
of policy rule templates and configurations.
3.7.1. Events
Events in the SecKit represent context situation changes and
activities (actions and interactions) between VOs, CVOs, and
Services in the iCore Framework. We model the start of an
activity, ongoing activities, and the completion of an activity
with the event indexes: start, ongoing, completed. To support
enforcement of usage control policies including authorization
decisions we model tentative and actual events. A tentative
event is generated when an activity is ready to be started by
the iCore Framework but has not started yet, giving the op-
portunity for the execution of enforcement actions to allow or
deny the execution of the activity.
The following specification models the supported event
types (Event) representing the lifecycle of system activities or
context situations. Event modalities are only used for activity
events because context situations are only detected and no
enforcement can take place to allow or deny situations, they
are simply observed. With the combination of the ongoing
index with a tentative modality we are able to model ongoing
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event trace is represented as a mapping of time steps ℕ in a
TimeStepWindow, which contains a set of observed events.
We also support events to represent the lifecycle (instan-
tiation and disposal) of system entities, behaviors, identities,
context information, and data. Due to space restrictions we do
not show the detailed formalization of these types of events,
we focus on the specification of interaction events. The
formalization of actions, flow points, context situations, and
lifecycle events are done in a similar way. Interaction events
reference instances of the respective interaction instance,
which contains details about the activity being executed.
Event patterns are specified for all event types and also for
a special event that denotes the end of a discrete time step
named TimestepEvent. Interaction event patterns include pat-
terns for the interactions contributions, data and identity
established by the interaction, behavior where the activity is
contained, and for the entity that executes the behavior.
Interaction contribution patterns also include behavior and
entity patterns to match the participants of the interaction. In
our policy rules we define conditions based on the occurrence
of events, and to specify this conditions we define event
pattern types with a ~pattern satisfaction relation.
3.7.2. Operators
The condition part of a rule template is a formula F, which
consists of constants, event patterns, trust patterns, proposi-
tional, temporal, and cardinality operators. The abstract syn-
tax of a formula is defined as:
Informally, the semantics of the temporal operators is: for
always the operand must have been true in all previous time
steps; for eventually the operand must have been true at least
once in all previous time steps; for since the first operandmust
have been true in all time steps since the second operand was
true, or the second operand has always been true (weak since
from LTL); for before, within, and during the formula operand
must have been true at a exact number of time steps ago, at
least once for a bounded number of previous time steps, or
during all bounded number of previous time steps; for repSince
is the same as since with an additional upper bound number
of times that the first formula may have been true; for repLimthe formulamust have been true during a bounded number of
previous time steps according to a lower and upper bound for
the number of occurrences. The formal semantics of the
temporal and cardinality operators is based on past time
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and is already described by Hilty
et al. (2007). The formal semantics of the EventPattern and
TrustAssessment was introduced by us in this Section.
3.7.3. Rule templates
The specification of authorization and obligation policy rules
is done in SecKit using a model containing rule templates
(RuleTemplate) that must be explicitly instantiated using rule
template configurations (TemplateConfiguration). Templates
are parametrized with variables that are instantiated by the
template configuration. When the rule is configured it is also
possible to specify when the rule should be disposed, after it is
triggered the first time, never, or also when a particular Event-
Condition is observed. By introducing templates we address
the challenge Support for the Digital Divide identified in the list
of challenges introduced in Section 3, allowing to less
knowledgeable users the selection of existing templates
instead of specifying their own.
The event part of a rule template is called the trigger event,
and is an event pattern matching operator that is also sup-
ported in the condition part. An event includes the details
about the activity being executed such as identity and roles of
the entities performing the activity, and information attri-
butes produced by the activity itself. For action events we can
trigger rules considering the entity executing the action, for
interaction events we can observe who are the interaction
participants and perform the respective enforcement.We also
support patterns of events capturing context information and
context situation changes, and lifecycle events for entity,
behavior, and data types.
The action part of an enforcement template consists of an
enforcement and an execution part. The enforcement part
refers to the trigger event of the rule template and may allow
or deny the execution of the respective activity. If the activity
is allowed, it is also possible to specify an optional modifica-
tion or delay of the activity execution, for example, anonym-
izing activity data before the activity takes place. The
anonymization could be the simple modification of a name
identity attribute to an empty string. The execution part of an
enforcement template may trigger the execution of additional
activities, for example, notifications or logging of information.
With the addition of these different enforcement and
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lenges Control of the data flow from IoT Device, Control of the ac-
tions of IoT actuators, and Anonymization of data identified in the
list of challenges introduced in Section 3.
In addition to enforcement templates we also support
instantiation templates, disposal templates, and condition
templates, in order to maximize re-use of enforcement rules
and to allow efficient monitoring of parametrized templates.
The action part of these templates implicitly instantiate and
dispose other rule templates when the event and condition
parts evaluates to true.
When composite enforcement templates are specified, a
combining strategy must be also specified in case multiple
rules are triggered resulting in a conflicting decision similar to
the XACML approach (Rissanen, 2010), such as allow over-
rides, deny overrides, or first applicable rule. Furthermore,
child/contained templatesmust specify a refined trigger event
in relation to its parent, which informally means that the
trigger pattern of child templates inherit the patterns specified
in the trigger of the parent rules. The general idea is to support
the re-use of the instantiation template to other enforcement
templates without loss of generality.
At runtime, all template configurations will be instantiated
using the variable assignments defined, resulting in a set of
rules. Our combining algorithmalways select themodification
or delay to apply considering the enforcement chosen ac-
cording to the strategy definition. The semantics of the
combining algorithm is recursive, where contained rules that
contain nested rules themselves are first evaluated and the
resulting enforcement is combined with the parent rule for a
unique enforcement result in a rule hierarchy.4. Architecture
Fig. 3 shows the SecKit enforcement components. In our
enforcement architecture the IoT System implementing the
iCore Framework is monitored by a technology specific Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP), which observes and intercepts service,
CVO, and VO invocations taking into account event sub-
scriptions by the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PEP component
signals these events to the PDP, and receives enforcementFig. 3 e Usage control enforcement architecture.actions in case a tentative event is signaled. If required for
policy evaluation the PDP may implement custom actions to
retrieve status information of VOs and CVOs, and subscribe to
context information and situation events with the Context
Manager component, both using existing functionality pro-
vided by the iCore Framework.
The subscription and signaling of events between the PDP
and PEP is done using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format
and HTTP. In the iCore Framework we implemented a PEP
component (Neisse, Steri et al.) embedded in the Message
Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) message broker that is
used as a middleware to enable the communication between
VOs, CVOs, and services. The PEP component functions as
reference monitor and it is implemented using runtime
monitoring techniques targeting the specific IoT technology in
place. When multiple technologies are used to enable the
communication and execution of VOs, CVOs, and services
more PEP components would have to be implemented to
monitor and generate events to the PDP component (see
Fig. 1).
In order tomaximize the efficiency and load distribution in
policy evaluation multiple PDP components may also be
required, with a distribution of policies considering their
scope. For example, if a set of policies only references events
generated by the Smart Home behavior, a PDP component
could be instantiated to monitor exclusively this set of pol-
icies. Specific architecture design issues and policy distribu-
tion are out of the scope of this paper.
Using the events signaled by the PEP, the PDP evaluates the
rule template configurations and rule instances. The current
set of policies (rule templates and configurations) deployed in
the PDP component is retrieved from a Policy Repository
component when the activation of the rules is signaled by the
Policy Server component. The Policy Management GUI compo-
nent includes an interface for authoring and management of
policy deployment integrated in the SecKit runtime GUI.4.1. Policy rule evaluation
Fig. 4 shows the monitoring approach we adopt for the tem-
plate configuration and enforcement rules evaluation. Rules
are instantiated by a Rule Template Configuration at a particular
moment in time, and an enforcement rule instance is created.
Each rule is configured with a time step size, which indicates
the granularity of the enforcement and events are observed
for each time step window according to this granularity. Our
PDP component is a rule engine that keeps track of all time
step granularities for the existing rule instances, observes the
events, and evaluates the rules at the end of each time step
window.Fig. 4 e Enforcement rule monitoring approach.
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observed, only the events in the current and previous time
step windows are kept following an approach similar to
Meredith et al. It uses simple three-value boolean states for all
operators, counters for the cardinality operators, and a cir-
cular buffer of n boolean states for the time bounded operators
supported in our language like before(n,4), which requires only
the storage of the truth value of 4 for the n previous time step
windows.
It is known that it is non-trivial to generate efficient run-
timemonitors for parametrized specifications (Meredith et al.,
Rosu), which is the case of rule templates. Monitoring of
parametrized templates is difficult to be realized because the
number of parameter bindings can be very large, and there are
only domain-specific solutions to handle this problem. In our
approach we specify explicitly the instantiation and disposal
of rule templates with variables to enable the efficient gen-
eration of monitors. By using the explicit instantiation of
parametrized templates we avoid the overhead of monitoring
all possible combinations of observed variable values, which
may be practical for a small set of variable values, but it easily
becomes intractable due to the large number of combinations
(Jin, 2012).5. Smart home case study
In order to show the feasibility of our approach we show the
application of the SecKit prototype to an IoT case study. We
chose a smart home scenario in which many IoT devices may
collaborate to control and automate functions like access
control to main gate and rooms, lights and heating adjust-
ment, perimeter surveillance, remote access to the devices
and their content, etc. Fig. 5 shows a diagram representing our
case study behaviors, actions, and interactions.
In Fig. 5, the Home Owner Device behavior interacts through
the Retrieve Temperature interaction with the Weather Station
behavior contained in the Smart Home. The temperature value
in this interaction is established by the Weather Station, and it
is used internally by the Home Owner Device as an input for the
Display temperature action. The interaction contributions (half
circles) between contained behaviors are drawn over theFig. 5 e Case study behavior model: (c)vos and interactions.border of the container behavior, which is a simplification to
represent a delegated interaction of the container behavior to
a contained behavior (e.g., Smart Home to Heart Rate Sensor).
The diagram in Fig. 5 also shows an interaction that en-
ables a Manufacturer System to update the firmware of the
weather station, and aMaintenance Employee to unlock a Smart
Lock by providing his/her identity information (e). Finally, the
Medical Center interacts with the Heart Rate Sensor in order to
retrieve the current heart rate of the Home Owner. We iden-
tified different types of data protection and trust requirements
in this scenario. Some interactions are only allowed to take
place for a specific amount of time or when a specific situation
occurs, for example, during a health emergency.
Concretely, in our case study we address a failure situation
that requires both a physical repair and a software firmware
update of a home IoT device. In this hypothetical situation we
assume the home owner is on holidays in another country and
he/she cannot directly intervene on the system. However, the
manufacturer of the broken product offers him/her full
assistance by on site repair through an outsourcing company
and by remote update of the firmware of the repaired device.
Fig. 5 shows the behavior model we have specified and
implemented using the SecKit GUI based on the diagram
shown in Fig. 6. This models represent the behaviors and
entities of the iCore Framework including VOs, CVOs, Ser-
vices, and their respective container entities. The behavior
types are assigned to the entity types, for example, the IoT
system behavior (see status bar in Fig. 6) is assigned to a CVO
entity.
Considering this scenario, trust is required to allow phys-
ical access to the house (or part of the house) by the mainte-
nance employee of the outsourcing company, and to allow the
firmware update by the manufacturer company. As a conse-
quence, the repair should be allowed only if both trust levels
satisfy the requirements imposed by the owner. Indeed, the
external company could have a bad reputation in terms ofFig. 6 e Behavior model specification.
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alone in the house, or a bad reputation to not complete the
service as agreed. The device manufacturer, on the other
hand, may have a bad reputation for quality of the firmware
updates performed, which could (intentionally) embed mali-
cious components able to endanger both physical and digital
integrity of the smart home. All the operations can be logged
and even recorded for auditing purposes by the home owner,
but his/her intervention is necessary only in case of anomalies
or exceptions to allow actions considered unsafe by the
system.
Fig. 7 illustrates the three trust management rule tem-
plates considered in our case study scenario. The first rule
template allows the maintenance employee to unlock the
door (i.e. tentative event) if the home owner trusts the com-
pany to complete the service as agreed, and if the consensus of
trust recommendations received indicates a disbelief with
respect to employee theft of home items for this company. We
assume the company is the issuer of the employee identity,
which is assigned to the variable employee-company with the
expression yeventyeyissuer. This rule illustrates an un-
trustworthy opinion that in fact has a positive interpretation:
the employees of the companies are not trustworthy to steal
items.
The second rule allows the firmware update if the
consensus of the recommendations for themanufacturer in the
interaction provide a secure firmware is at least trustworthy.
The trust relationships defined in our model focus on the
trustworthiness of an entity to participate in an interaction
assuming a particular role. The third rule updates the trust
relationship of the maintenance company if the home owner
executes the Positive Service Feedback action, which has the
employee identity as a parameter, as illustrated in the
behavior model in Fig. 6. The instantiation of variables refer-
ring to the trigger event of the rule templates uses XPath or
Regular Expressions to assign values dynamically at rule
evaluation time.Fig. 7 e Trust-based authorizationTo illustrate the specification of a complex rule template
we show another example from our case study in Fig. 8. In this
example a composite rule template is specified to deny by
default access when any entity tries to access the heart rate
information of a specific home owner. However, access is
allowed if within n timesteps (e.g., 3 h) a In health emergency
context situation involving the home owner is detected. Ac-
cess is also allowed if the entity trying to access to the heart
rate is a member of the Doctor role type. This example illus-
trates the nesting of enforcement template configurations in
rule templates to maximize re-use and the selection of a
conflict resolution strategy with the Allow overrides combining
algorithm.
Rules can be specified using context situation events,
temporal operators, and trust bootstrapping using disposi-
tional trust values by default. Furthermore, rules can be
specified to decrease the trust degrees everyday by a specific
amount assigning old experiences or recommendations a
lower weight. An interesting application is also the imple-
mentation of alternative behaviors to require explicit consent
to allow other people inside the house in addition to the trust-
based decisions if home owner is on holidays.
5.1. Performance evaluation
We designed using the extended version of the iCore Frame-
work integrated with our SecKit a model of a Smart City sce-
nario, and used this model as input for the simulation of our
Policy Decision Point (PDP) component. The PDP component is
implemented as a rule engine that evaluates the rule config-
urations and instantiates templates. Fig. 9 (left side) shows the
sequence diagram describing the simulation we implemented
to evaluate the performance and scalability of the PDP rule
evaluation algorithm.
When the Demo Scenario starts, it creates all the design
models using the SecKit libraries, instantiates a new PDP
component, and subscribes to this PDP as an event providerand update rule templates.
Fig. 8 e Role and context-based rule templates.
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and the PDP component instantiates the rule configurations
specified in the rule model. The instantiation of the rule
configurations triggers the subscription to events, which are
notified by the Demo Scenario component to the PDP in order
to generate event notifications.
In our simulation we deployed at the start 3000 sets of
the example policy templates and configuration shown in
Fig. 8 with a time step granularity of 2 s for monitoring. The
Demo Scenario generated every 2 s simulated events
matching all event subscriptions, and we performed mea-
surements of elapsed clock time for notification of all
events resulting in an update of all deployed rule instances.
In the enforcement template we used in our simulation we
have a composite enforcement rule template with two
nested rules, and a total of four event subscriptions. This
gives a ratio of four event subscriptions for three rule in-
stances, while the instantiation template specifies one
event subscription, and it is the only template configured at
start. With this configuration, our simulation starts with
3000 instances of the instantiation template that is trig-
gered at every time step and incrementally instantiates
3000 new enforcement rules. The newly instantiated
enforcement rules at each time step increase incrementally
the load of the PDP component.Fig. 9 e Sequence diagram and eFig. 9 (right side) shows the result graph of the clock time
taken by the Demo Scenario to notify all events versus the
number of event states needed to be updated for each event
subscription in the PDP memory. For almost 250 thousand
event states, the clock time to update all rule instances was
around 700 ms. The update time is very efficient because in
our implementation we use hash map associations consid-
ering the subscribed events and the states in the rule in-
stances that should be updated for each event subscription.
Each notified event triggers a search in the hash table that
contains the list of states to be checked for update.We run our
simulation for 20 time steps and the total number of rule in-
stances under the maximum load was around 156 thousand.
Our simulation does not consider performance issues in a
distributed setting such as the encoding and decoding of
events, network communication, and overhead for mutual
authentication and session management. Our objective was
the evaluation of the core policy rule evaluation and event
matching functionalities of our PDP component when a sig-
nificant number of rules are monitored. The complexity of the
evaluation also depends on the structure of the enforcement
rules, the number of variable instantiations using XPath ex-
pressions, and on the number of triggered rules in a time step
that must be handled by the PDP. In our simulation all rules
are triggered in all time steps, which is by far anvent notification throughput.
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handle the triggering of rules.
The average memory usage in our simulation was 750 MB
for 3 runs. This amount includes the requirements of the
SecKit design models and Demo Scenario simulation with the
instantiation of all events and rules. The implementation of
SecKit and the demo scenario was done in Java with (meta)
models implemented using the Eclipse Modeling Framework
(EMF). All simulations were executed in a CPU Intel Core i7-
2600 3.4 GHz with 8 GB of physical memory running Win-
dows 7 Professional. This powerful machine configuration
may not seem realistic in an IoT scenario. However, in our
current IoT architecture and implementation, the evaluation
of policies is never done in the end devices, which act only as
PEPs in our IoT architecture. The evaluation is done by the PDP
component due to processing, memory, and battery con-
straints of this end devices and also to prevent a communi-
cation overhead, since the evaluation of policies may require
external information (e.g., context) that would have to be
distributed to all devices for policy evaluation.
In the second part of our evaluation we measured the
performance of a PEP component implemented by us as a
security plug-in of the Mosquitto open source MQTT broker
(Mosquitto, 2014). This evaluation considers the overhead of
the PEP component independently of the delay introduced by
the PDP to process the events, which depends on the number
of event subscription and active policies. In this scenario two
IoT boards were used as MQTT publishers an subscribers
exchanging GPS location information. The two boards are
equippedwith a 400 MHz ARM9 processor and 256 MB of RAM,
running a Linux Debian operating system. The MQTT broker
was deployed in a Raspberry Pi version 1 model Bþ with a
700 MHz ARM11 processor and 512 MB of RAM, also running a
Linux Debian operating system. All the boards were connect
using WiFi and the communication with the PDP via a wired
Ethernet connection.
In our performance evaluations we measured the delay in
the exchange of MQTT messages with and without the PEP in
order to measure the delay introduced with the policy
enforcement. The average delay introduced in the exchange of
1200 messages was of 13 ms, increasing from 513 ms with the
PEP disabled to 529ms with the PEP enabled. These results are
nearly the same considering our previous measurements
(Neisse, Steri et al.), where amore powerfulmachinewas used
as MQTT broker and the average delays were of 515 ms and
525 ms with the PEP disabled and enabled respectively. In this
average time of around 500ms per event the PEP embedded in
the MQTT broker signals two events to the PDP, one event
when the message is published and one event when the
message is delivered to the subscriber.
The PEP notifies the PDP with events when clients connect,
subscribe/publish messages in the topics, and when clients
disconnect. For tentative events where enforcement actions
may take place, the PDP sends back to the PEP the encoded
actions to allow, deny, modify, or delay the execution. The
size of the events and of the enforcement action encoded
using JSON is in the order of hundreds of bytes depending on
the number of attributes of the message. For example, in the
event where the client publishes the GPS location in the topic,
the data published is also included in the event sent to the PDPand the event size is 225 bytes. The size of the PDP enforce-
ment simply allowing the operation is of 63 bytes.
We also evaluated the case where the PEP component is
not integrated in theMQTT broker but directly runs as a native
program in the Raspberry Pi board itself. In this experimentwe
configured our PEP to send 100 event notifications in order to
measure the amount of CPU taken to send the events and
receive the answer from the PDP component. The total time
takenwas of around 800ms of real time for all 100 events, with
an average of 80 ms real time and 34 ms CPU time per event.6. Related work
After having analyzed existing approaches for security and
privacy in IoT platforms we have not found any holistic
approach similar to the SecKit that considers in an integrated
way identities, context, trust, and complex policy rules.
Therefore, we present in this section existing approaches for
trust management of IoT scenarios and for specification and
enforcement of security policies in IoT and Body Area Net-
works (BAN) that are not as comprehensive as the SecKit.
Paul et al. (2011) provide a survey of architectures for the
future networks and internet. The survey is quite extensive
and describe a wide range of projects, architecture frame-
works, and technical solutions from different sources. We
focus on the specific area of data protection and privacy,
where their survey indicates that a correct representation and
definition of the relationships in the systems is key tomitigate
security threats and improve the robustness of the system.
Relationships can be (at least) composed by the information of
the identity of their members, their features, which translates
to the roles in the relationship and the policies that can be
applied to the relationships. Their survey paper does not
describe in detail the technical solutions or approaches, which
can be adopted to support the definition of the relationships.
This paper proposes a toolkit that can be used to model these
relationship and support the consistent specification and
enforcement of authorization and obligation policies.
Traditional access control mechanisms like ABAC or RBAC
are often not scalable for complex IoT scenarios considering
the amount of data that is processed. Gusmeroli et al. (2013)
acknowledge these limitations of ABAC and RBAC and
describe a capability based access control system that users
can use to manage their own access control processes to
services and information. Their proposed mechanism sup-
ports rights delegation and the customization of the access
control configurationwithout support for complex obligations
with a rich policy language, which are supported by our
toolkit.
Hernandez-Ramos et al. (2013) builds up on the capability-
based approach and proposes a distributed version using
capability tokens for CoAP Resources signed with the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) in order to ensure
end-to-end authentication, integrity and non-repudiation.
This solution allows IoT devices to take policy decisions
without contacting a central Policy Decision Point (PDP)
component, which is sufficient with policies that do not
require external information. The authors also show a solu-
tion where a central PDP component is used to support
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language and structure of these policies. Considering that
revocation of tokens are needed in the capability-based solu-
tions, in order to prevent unauthorized access the IoT devices
always have to contact a revocation authority to verify if to-
kens are still valid. Furthermore, policies with complex
context-based or trust-based conditions would require more
processing power from IoT devices and queries to external
information (e.g., context managers) in order to decide if the
access should be allowed or not. A subset of our policy lan-
guage with simple conditions and improved expressiveness
could be used in capability tokens still with the benefit of
allowing delays andmodifications in addition to allow or deny
access to an IoT device. An important result of this work is the
performance analysis in very constrained devices with
respect to the use of ECDSA.
In the context of Body Area Networks (BAN), Keoh et al.
(2007) provide an implementation of a PDP component for the
Ponder2 policy language in the TinyOS platform. From a policy
language expressiveness point of view, Ponder2 supports ECA
rules with simple propositional conditions without support for
context-based, trust-based, temporal, and cardinality opera-
tors. The authors present performance results for policy eval-
uation in the order of 50 ms for simple policies with one event
and a simple action without taking into consideration the dis-
tribution of components. Our performance results are not
comparable since our policy language is more expressive and
we consider the distribution of PEPs and PDPs, without evalu-
ation policies directly in the constrainted IoT devices.
The ETSI Technical Committee (TC) for Machine to Ma-
chine (M2M) proposes an architecture suitable as a horizontal
platform for use by many M2M verticals (e.g., Smart Cars).
Security aspects are also investigated, but are limited to
message integrity, authentication, and/or signer authentica-
tion services (ETSI, 2011; ETSI, 2012). The toolkit proposed in
this paper proposes concepts, which are very similar to what
proposed by ETSI TC M2M, but our framework defines more
sophisticated solutions for the specification and enforcement
of the policies and the management of dynamic contexts that
are complimentary to this standard. The M2M access control
is relatively simple and it does not support changes in the
context or complex policies.
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) envisions the communi-
cation, access and exchange of information over any network
and through any user device, regardless of the service being
used. In particular, the OMA Lightweight M2M (LWM2M) pro-
tocol is an approach for a new standard for remote manage-
ment of M2M devices and application management based on
the LWM2M Server and Client concepts. Regarding security
aspects, the LWM2M technical specification document (OMA,
2013) addresses access control issues, which are also sup-
ported by our toolkit. In addition, OMA has developed speci-
fications to protect the digital content through a Digital Rights
Management (DRM) approach described by Irwin (2004). The
OMA solution strongly relies on cryptography and policies,
simply considering the authorization to share data over
multiple devices without support for complex policy condi-
tions and obligations.
The XACMLpolicy language (Rissanen, 2010) is a rule-based
language with attribute assertion operators that supportsauthorization request and response messages. In contrast to
XACML, our rule metamodel specified in the SecKit is event-
based, and allows specification of general purpose enforce-
ment rules including authorizations and obligations using a
common ECA format. XACML supports only propositional
operators (e.g., and/or) in their rule constructs and simple
string/propositional obligations that must be fulfilled when
the access is granted. The condition part of the rules sup-
ported by SecKit includes propositional, temporal, and cardi-
nality operators. A simple policy stating that an account should
be blocked after 3 failed logins or an obligation to delete VO
3 h after emergency situation has finished can not be expressed
with standard XACML. Our rule model also supports modifi-
cation and delay enforcement behaviors in addition to allow
and deny, and the re-use of rules and modular specification
with rule templates. The integrated approach adopted by the
SecKit also considers the precise relation of policy rules to the
system design models in order to check policy consistency,
and allows the identification of PEP locations considering the
events of interest referenced in the policies.
The concept of trust as belief in a “correct” behavior of the
system is related to the concept of reputation, which can be
considered as the distributed measure of trust among
different entities. Trust and reputation systems are then the
starting point for all trust management models, including the
ones in IoT. Trust management mechanisms have been
already adopted for P2P and grid systems, first with the basic
goal of assigning and managing trust ratings (Singh and Liu,
2003), and then with more advanced features like reputation
and risk evaluation as a prediction for short-term behavior
(Liang and Shi, 2005). These kind of approaches have been the
basis for one of the first formal trust management control
mechanism in IoT (Lize et al., 2014), in which the IoT archi-
tecture is modeled in sensor, core and application layer. Each
layer is controlled by a specialized trust management mech-
anism which delivers information for decisions made by a
service requester also according to policy rules. Our trust
model is not limited to three architectural layers and has a
more precise and expressive approach for modeling of trust
relationships and security policy rules.
Bao and Chen present in (Bao and Chen, 2012) a trust
management protocol for IoT with the emphasis on social
relationships. Considering some trust properties, trust eval-
uation is performed by objects on a limited set of both direct
and indirect observations. The result is a trade-off between
trust assessment accuracy and trust convergence time,
compared to the performances obtained using a global
knowledge. In a similar way, the same authors in Bao et al.
(2013), show scalability and adaptiveness of a trust manage-
ment protocol in case of limited storage space, i.e. where the
objects keep trust information only about a subset of other
objects meeting their interest, allowing to perform minimum
computation to update trust. Also in this case, they show how
performances are comparable to the ones obtained using
unlimited storage capacity. The focus of these approaches are
on computation and convergence of trust measurements
without considering the semantics of the trust values, which
are clearly defined in our trust model.
Other approaches to trustmanagement, initially developed
for semantic web (Golbeck and Hendler, 2004), express trust
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ation between trust values and algorithms (trust metrics) to
make trust decisions.Nevertheless ontologies in IoThavebeen
proposed to face more general challenges, like heterogeneity
and scalability of the devices (Hachemet al., 2011). Our system
and trust metamodels can be used as a reference ontology,
filling the gap for the specific challenge of trust in IoT.
More general purpose trust management approaches (Yau
et al., 2014) model trust without considering the model of the
system (e.g., activities, data, and identities), and as a conse-
quence, it is unclear how trust relationships should be asso-
ciated with IoT devices considering their interactions and
different trust aspects. The combination of trust relationships
using rules presented in this paper is a generic model of the
work on trust assessment in context-aware service platforms
done by Neisse et al. (2014). To the best of our knowledge we
are the first to propose a trust model that is associated to a
reference system model and is integrated with a security
policy language.7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we presented a Model-based Security Toolkit
(SecKit) integrated in the framework proposed by the iCore
Project that enables usage control and protection of user data.
We show the application of the SecKit in a Smart City scenario
to evaluate its feasibility and performance. Our case study
demonstrates the flexibility and efficiency of SecKit to support
the specification and evaluation of security policies specified
using rule templates. We have released the SecKit as an open
source project and our goal is to enable community driven
specification of policy templates and implementation of
technology specific add-ons focusing on enforcement com-
ponents for different IoT target technologies and application
domains. The adoption of SecKit by many stakeholders has
the potential to enable and improve cross-domain security
alignment and interoperability.
The trust model we proposed allows the specification of
different types of trust relationships and aspects to govern the
trust relationships in the IoT interactions. This model con-
siders the reference system model for definition of trust as-
pects and it supports the design of expressive trust-based
security policy rules. The feasibility of our model and the
specification of trust management rule templates is also
shown in our case study and prototype implementation.
Considering the positive evaluation results of our imple-
mentation in Java we intend to implement a native binary
version (e.g., in C/Cþþ) to target resource constrained devices
including mobile phones and low-power/cost platforms such
as the PandaBoard or Raspberry PI platforms that could act as
PDP nodes in addition to PEP nodes as described in this paper.
An interesting outcome would be an IoT domain security
management node capable of evaluating security policies and
managing smart home identities in an efficient and secure
way, including support for context reasoning, trust relation-
ships, and complex security rules.
As future work we plan to work towards the integration
of trust and risk models following up in the approach
introduced by some of the co-authors in Kounelis et al.(2014). Furthermore, we plan to investigate more advanced
distributed trust reasoning approaches and fusion operators
using input from Collaborative Filtering research consid-
ering similarity and partial obfuscation of the trustors'
identities and profiles. Finally, an important aspect is the
analysis of static and dynamic information flow considering
the causality relations specified in the behavior models and
runtime events.
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